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A Military Enigma 
The Canadian Special Air Service 
Company, 1948-1949 
Bernd Horn 
T he Canadian Special Air Service (SAS) Company is truly a military enigma. Very few 
people are aware of its short-lived existence. 
Those who are normally have a misunder-
standing of its origins and role, a misconception 
largely reinforced by the sparse and largely 
inaccurate material that has been written on the 
subject. For example, most believe that it was 
raised specifically to provide a commando 
capability within the Canadian Army immediately 
after the Second World War. 
The story of the Canadian SAS Company is 
actually surreptitious. The army originally 
packaged the sub-unit as a very benevolent 
organization, centred on aid to the civil authority 
and assistance to the general public. Once 
established, however, a fundamental and 
contentious shift in its orientation became evident 
-one that was never fully resolved prior to the 
sub-unit's demise. With time, myths, often 
enough repeated, took on the essence of fact. 
The cessation of hostilities in the spring of 
1945, not only brought the Second World War to 
an end, but also closed the chapter on Canada's 
premiere airborne unit, the First Canadian 
Parachute Battalion. The paratroop unit was 
formally disbanded on 30 September 1945, and 
no immediate plans were made for its 
replacement. The long costly global struggle had 
taken its toll and a debt-ridden and war-weary 
government was intent on a post -war army which 
was anything but extravagant. 
Notwithstanding the military's achievements 
during the war, the Canadian government had 
but two requirements for its peacetime army. 
First, it was to consist of a representative group 
of all arms of the service. Second, it was to 
provide a small but highly trained and skilled 
professional force which, in time of conflict, could 
expand and train citizen soldiers who would fight 
that war. 1 Within this framework paratroopers 
had limited relevance. Not surprisingly, few 
showed concern for the potential loss of Canada's 
hard-earned airborne experience. 
In the austere postwar climate of"minimum 
peace-time obligations," the fate of Canada's 
airborne soldiers was dubious at best. 2 The 
training of new paratroopers at the Canadian 
Parachute Training Centre in Shilo had ceased 
as early as May 1945.3 The school itself faced a 
tenuous future. Its survival hung in the air 
pending the final decision on the structure of the 
post-war army. 
Nevertheless, the parachute school, largely 
on its own initiative, worked to keep abreast of 
airborne developments and attempted to 
perpetuate the links with American and British 
airborne units which had been forged in the 
Second World War. The efforts of individuals such 
as Major George Flint, the Commanding Officer 
of the airborne training centre, became 
instrumental in maintaining a degree of airborne 
expertise. He selectively culled the ranks of the 
disbanding 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion and 
chose the best from the pool of personnel who 
had decided to remain in the Active Force to act 
as instructors and staff for his training 
establishment. "No one knew what we were 
supposed to do," recalled Lieutenant Bob Firlotte, 
one of the individuals hand-picked to serve at 
the training centre, "and we received absolutely 
no direction from Army Headquarters. "4 
However, Flint and his staff filled the vacuum. 
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Lieutenant Ken Arril, the Officer Commanding 
the Technical Tactical Investigation Section 
(TTIS) in 1945-1946, stated that he was 
primarily focussed on making contacts and 
keeping up-to-date with the latest airborne 
developments. 5 These prescient efforts were soon 
to be rewarded. 
The perpetuation of links with Canada's 
closest allies, as well as the importance of staying 
abreast of the latest tactical developments in 
modern warfare, specifically air-transportability, 
provided the breath of life that Flint and other 
airborne advocates were looking for. A 194 7 
National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) study 
revealed that British peacetime policy was based 
on training and equipping all infantry formations 
to be air-transportable. 6 Furthermore, closer 
discussions ascertained that both the Americans 
and the British would welcome an Airborne 
Establishment in Canada that would be capable 
of"filling in the gaps in their knowledge." These 
"gaps" included the problem of standardization 
of equipment between Britain and the United 
States, and the need for experimental research 
22 
Paratroopers exiting a C-47 Dakota. 
into cold weather conditions. Canada seemed to 
be the ideal intermediary for both needs. 7 
It was not lost on the Canadians that 
cooperation with its closest defence partners 
would allow Canada to benefit from an exchange 
of information on the latest defence developments 
and doctrine. For the airborne advocates, a test 
facility was not a parachute unit, but it would 
allow the Canadian military to stay in the game. 
During the interim period, NDHQ considered 
various configurations for an airborne research 
and development centre and/or parachute 
training school. In the end, for the sake of 
efficiency of manpower and resources, National 
Defence Headquarters decided that both entities 
should be incorporated into a single Canadian 
Joint Army I Air Training Centre. As a result, on 
15 August 1947, military headquarters 
authorized the formation of the Joint Air School 
(JAS), in Rivers, Manitoba. 8 
For the airborne advocates the JAS became 
the "foot in the door." The military command now 
entrusted the Joint Air School with the retention 
of skills required for airborne operations, for 
both the Army and the RCAF. Its specific mandate 
included: 
a. Research in Airportability of Army 
personnel and equipment. 
b. User Trials of equipment, especially under 
cold weather conditions. 
c. Limited Development and Assessment of 
Airborne equipment. 
d. Training of Paratroop volunteers; training 
in Airportability of personnel and 
equipment; training in maintenance of air; 
advanced training of Glider pilots in 
exercises with troops; training in some of 
the uses of light aircraft.9 
More important, the JAS, which was later 
officially renamed the Canadian Joint Air 
Training Centre (CJATC), provided the seed from 
which airborne organizations could grow. 10 
Once the permanent structure of the army 
was established in 194 7, the impetus for 
expanding the airborne capability began to stir 
within the Joint Air School. The growth 
manifested itself in a proposal supported by 
Army Headquarters in Ottawa, in May 194 7, for 
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a Canadian Special Air Service (SAS) Company. 11 
This organization was to be an integral sub-unit 
of the Army component of the JAS. Its purpose 
was defined in June of the same year as filling a 
need to perform Army, inter-service, and public 
duties such as Army I Air tactical research and 
development; demonstrations to assist with 
Army I Air training; Airborne Firefighting; Search 
and Rescue; and Aid to the Civil PowerY~ Its 
development, however, proved to be very 
surreptitious. 
The initial proposal prescribed a clearly 
defined role. The Army, which sponsored the 
establishment of the fledgling organization, 
portrayed the SAS Company's inherent mobility 
as a definite asset to the public at large for 
domestic operations. A military appreciation 
eloquently expressed the benefit of the unique 
sub-unit in terms of its potential benefit to the 
country. It explained that the specially trained 
company would provide an "efficient life and 
property saving organization capable of moving 
from its base to any point in Canada in ten to 
fifteen hours. "13 The official DND Report for 1948, 
reinforced this sentiment. Its rationale for the 
establishment of the SAS Company was the 
cooperation "with the R.C.A.F. in the air search-
rescue duties required by the International Civil 
Aviation Organization agreement."14 
The proposed training plan further 
supported this benevolent image. The training 
cycle consisted of four phases: 1.) Tactical 
Research and Development (parachute related 
work and fieldcraft skills); 2.) Airborne 
Firefighting; 3.) Air Search and Rescue; and 4.) 
Mobile Aid to the Civil Power (crowd control, first 
aid, military law). 15 Conspicuously absent was 
any evidence of commando or specialist training 
which the organization's name implied. After all, 
the Canadian SAS Company was actually titled 
after the British wartime Special Air Service that 
earned a reputation for daring commando·· type 
raids behind enemy lines. 16 Yet the name of the 
Canadian sub-unit was a total contradiction to 
its stated role. It was also not in consonance with 
the four phases of allocated training. Something 
was clearly amiss. Either the sub-unit was named 
incorrectly or its operational and training focus 
was misrepresented. Initially no one seemed to 
notice. 
Four 'jumpers" at Rivers, Manitoba, 1948. 
(l. tor.: L!Cpl Dawm, Pte. Roberts, 
L!Cpl. Reeves, and Pte. Tredwell. 
In September 194 7, the Director of Weapons 
and Development forwarded the request for the 
new organization to the Deputy Chief of the 
General Staff. This submission affixed two 
additional roles to the SAS Company. One was 
"public service in the event of a national 
catastrophe." The other was the "provision of a 
nucleus for expansion into parachute battalions." 
Despite the additional duties, the memorandum 
reinforced that "This [SAS] Company is required 
immediately for training as it is these troops who 
will provide the manpower for the large 
programme of test and development that must 
be carried out by the Tactical Research and 
Development Wing." It further outlined the 
requirement for the SAS Company to "provide 
the demonstration team for all demonstrations 
within and outside the School."17 Once again there 
was no emphasis on a special forces or war-
fighting orientation. 
However, "mission creep" began to appear in 
late October 194 7. Embedded in an assessment 
of potential benefits that the proposed Canadian 
SAS Company could provide to the army was an 
entirely new idea hitherto unmentioned. "The 
formation of a SAS Company," the report 
explained, "is in line with British Army Air Group 
post war plans; whereby the SAS is being retained 
as a small group integrated within the Airborne 
Division. This provision is to keep the techniques 
employed by SAS persons during the war alive 
in the peacetime army."18 Although appearing last 
in the order of priority in the list, in practise it 
would soon move to the forefront. 
Once the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) 
authorized the sub-unit, with an effective date of 
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9 January 1948, a dramatic change in focus 
became evident. Not only did its function as a 
base for expansion for the development of 
airborne units take precedence, but also the 
previously subtle reference to a war fighting, 
special forces role, leapt to the foreground. The 
new terms of reference for the employment of 
the SAS Company outlined the following duties 
in a revised priority: 
24 
a. Provide a tactical parachute company for 
airborne training. This company is to form the 
nucleus for expansion for the training of the three 
infantry battalions as parachute battalions. 
SAS Company paratroopers loading a 
C -119 Boxcar aircraft (left) and the 
subsquent para-drop (below l~ft). 
b. Provide a formed body of troops to 
participate in tactical exercises and 
demonstrations for courses at the 
CJATC and service units throughout 
the country. 
c. Preserve and advance the techniques 
of SAS [commando] operations 
developed during WW II 1939-1945. 
d. Provide when required parachutists 
to back-up the RCAF organizations as 
detailed in the Interim Plan for air 
Search and Rescue. 
e. Aid Civil Authorities in fighting 
forest fires and assist in national 
catastrophes when authorized by 
Defence Headquarters.'" 
The shift was anything but subtle. 
The original emphasis on aid to the 
civil authority and public service 
functions, duties which could be 
justified to a war-weary government 
and a budget conscious military 
leadership, were now re-prioritized 
if not totally marginalized. In all 
fairness, the changing terms of 
reference for the Special Air Service 
Company was in part pragmatic. It 
represented the army's initial 
reaction to the Government's 
announcement in 1946, that 
contemplated airborne training for 
the Active Force Brigade Group and 
that an establishment to this end was 
being created. 20 But, the dramatic 
mission shift also represented a case 
of "gamesmanship." It allowed the 
strong airborne lobby within the 
Canadian Joint Air Training Centre, and others 
in the army with wartime airborne experience, 
an opportunity to perpetuate a capability that they 
believed was at risk. 21 
This was clearly evident in the 1948-1949 
Historical Report for the Joint Air School. The 
Army Component of the JAS explained the 
establishment of the SAS Company in the 
following terms: "The Special Air Service 
originated during World War II when after 
numerous operations military authorities were 
convinced that a few men working behind enemy 
lines, could, with sufficient bluff and daring 
4
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wreak havoc with supplies and communications. 
Results obtained during the war assured its 
continued existence."22 The report was not only 
incorrect in its assessment of the value placed 
on special operations type units during the war, 
but more importantly, it clearly reflected a war 
fighting rather than public service orientation. 23 
This was in complete contrast to the rationale 
used to justify the establishment of the sub-unit. 
It was, however, consistent with the beliefs of 
those who were selected to serve in the 
organization. 
If there was any confusion in regard to the 
purpose and role of the SAS Company, it certainly 
did not exist in the mind of the Officer 
Commanding (OC) the sub-unit. The new 
organization was established at a company 
strength of 125 and comprised one platoon from 
each of the three regular infantry regiments, the 
Royal Canadian Regiment (RCR), the Royal 22nd 
Regiment (R22eR) and Princess Patricia's 
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). Captain Guy 
D'Artois, a wartime member of the First Special 
Service Force, and later the Special Operations 
Executive (SOE), was posted to the sub-unit as 
its Second in Command. Contrary to popular 
mythology, Captain D'Artois was not selected as 
OC of the SAS Company based on his wartime 
experience or exploits. In fact, he was not 
originally considered at all. Within some elements 
of the army "the future of the SAS Coy" was 
apparently "in doubt." As a result, little effort was 
made to find a qualified 'Major' to fill the billet 
as OCY Therefore, Captain D'Artois, by default, 
became the Acting Officer Commanding. By late 
October 1948, the sub-unit's existence was 
considered secure and efforts were then made 
to find a suitable candidate. In what could be 
considered testimony to military bureaucracy, the 
demise of the unit occurred prior to the 
appointment of a new OC. As a result, D'Artois 
was the first and only Officer Commanding, albeit 
in an acting capacity. His performance, however, 
was outstanding by all accounts. 
D'Artois trained his sub-unit of carefully 
selected paratroopers as a specialized 
commando force. 25 His intractable approach and 
trademark persistence quickly made him the 
"absolute despair of the Senior Officers at Rivers 
[CJATC]."26 Veterans of the SAS Company 
explained that "Captain D'Artois didn't 
understand 'no.' He carried on with his training 
regardless of what others said. "27 Another veteran 
recalled that "Guy answered to no one, he was 
his own man, who ran his own show. "28 
Organizationally the sub-unit may have been 
solid, but its future was not. Its ultimate function 
and role were obscured by varied interpretations. 
As early as May 1948, less than six months since 
its establishment, the Army's Director of Air was 
compelled to defend the existence of the SAS 
Company against calls for a review of its mandate. 
Interestingly, he rationalized the necessity of not 
only maintaining the sub-unit, but also of 
ensuring its continuance at full strength because 
of the expertise the members represented in such 
fields as "airbome, airtransported, air supply and 
SAS operations." He argued this would be 
difficult to recapture "if they were required to 
reconstitute the SAS Company or as a nucleus 
of an SAS Regiment. "29 Clearly, his image of the 
organization's raison d'etre was at variance with 
the original purpose given for its establishment. 
But the central issue remained. Was the SAS 
Company in fact the nucleus of a larger airborne 
force? Was it designed to be an elite commando 
unit? Or was it just simply a demonstration team 
for the Canadian Joint Air Training Centre? 
Evidence exists to support each perspective. :Jo 
This confusion was merely a symptom of a larger 
problem, namely there was no clear 
understanding or agreement of the role the 
paratroopers were to fulfill. It was characteristic 
of the blight that has permeated the entire 
Canadian airborne experience over the years. 
The major problem was the lack of a coherent 
role for Canadian airbome forces, which not only 
justified their existence, but also warranted the 
full support of the entire military and political 
leadership. The continued survival of the CJATC 
and its limited airbome capability was largely 
due to an American and British preoccupation 
with airborne and air-transportable forces in the 
postwar period. This was based on a concept of 
security established on smaller standing forces 
with greater tactical and strategic mobility. The 
cash-strapped Canadian political and military 
leadership also came to realize that such a force 
could provide a great political expedient. It 
provided the shell under which the government 
could claim it was meeting its obligations, yet 
minimize its actual defence expenditures. In 
essence, possession of paratroopers could 
25 
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SAS Company paratroopers providing a "wind machine" training demonstration 
at the Joint Air School, Rivers, Manitoba, January-February 1948. 
represent the nation's ready sword. They afforded 
a conceivably viable means to combat any hostile 
intrusion to the North. Better still, they would 
be incredibly cheap, if they were maintained 
simply as a 'paper tiger.' 
In addition, looming in the background was 
the 1946 Canada/U.S. Basic Security Plan which 
imposed on Canada the requirement to provide 
one airborne/ air-transportable brigade, and its 
necessary airlift, as its share of the overall 
continental defence agreement.:ll This obligation 
necessitated the retention of the Canadian Joint 
Air Training Centre. It also prompted the spark 
which fuelled the need for an organization which 
would act as a training tool and potential nucleus 
for an expanded airborne force. 32 As noted earlier, 
in 1946, the government had briefed Parliament 
that airborne training was planned for the Active 
Force Brigade Group. Yet, no action was taken 
for more than two years. The SAS Company 
represented the total sum of Canada's operational 
airborne capability. Incredibly, for most of that 
period contentious debate continued over its 
actual function and role. 
By the summer of 1948, some form of action 
was required. The creation of the airborne/air-
transportable Brigade Group had not advanced 
beyond the conceptual agreement of the senior 
26 
military commanders. The plan finally moved 
forward with the Joint Air Committee decision 
that: 
The CGS, Canadian Army desires to commence 
the training of one battalion of infantry for 
airborne I air- transported operations. This one 
battalion is the Canadian component to meet 
the immediate requirements of the BSP. The air 
training of this battalion (less collective battalion 
exercise) is required to be completed by 1 April 
1949."" 
The spark was prompted not by 
governmental or military diligence, but again by 
the spectre of the Americans. The Basic Security 
Plan of two years previous had obligated the 
Canadian army to be prepared for Arctic airborne 
and/or air-transportable operations, to counter 
or reduce enemy lodgements in Canada. This 
program compelled the Canadian government to 
have a battalion combat team prepared by 1 May 
1949 to respond immediately to any actual 
lodgement, with a second battalion available 
within two months, and an entire brigade group 
within four months. 34 Time was running out and 
with the possible exception of the Special Air 
Service Company, nothing had been done. 
Two years had elapsed since the 
government's public declaration that the Active 
Force Brigade Group would become an airborne/ 
air-transportable organization. Yet it was not until 
6
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July 1948, that NDHQ granted authority to 
commence airborne/ air-transportable training. It 
was another month before these words were 
finally translated into action. At this time the 
VCGS, Major-General Churchill Mann, visited the 
PPCLI battalion in Calgary and asked them to 
convert to airborne status. Training, he stated, 
was to commence in three months time and was 
to be completed by May 1949. The effect was 
profound. The unit in its entirety volunteered for 
airborne service.35 The first concrete step to 
establish the airborne I air-transportable brigade, 
as required by the 1946 Basic Security Plan, had 
finally been taken. 
The effect on the existing small SAS Company 
was immediate and corrosive. Initially the sub-
unit lost only its PPCLI platoon which formed 
the training cadre for the conversion of the 
'Patricia' battalion. Army Headquarters directed 
that the SAS Company's 'Patricia' platoon, once 
it had completed its instructional tasks, be 
permanently stripped from the sub-unit so that 
the platoon could return to Calgary with its parent 
regiment to provide a core of experienced 
paratroop instructors. 36 Although a replacement 
platoon from the service support trades was 
raised, the fate of the SAS Company was sealed. 37 
Its personnel were increasingly drafted as 
instructional staff for the Canadian Joint Air 
Training Centre training scheme to convert the 
remaining two infantry battalions into airborne/ 
air-transportable units. 
During this period the ongoing debate over 
the SAS Company's actual role and existence 
resurfaced. In September 1948, in light of the 
creation of the Mobile Striking Force (MSF), the 
Director of Military Training in NDHQ demanded 
a reassessment of the Canadian SAS Company. 
"I cannot," he argued, "agree with what appears 
to be the present concepts of the SAS Company." 
He identified the contradiction between the 
original intent and the actual practise. He added, 
"I feel first and foremost that its name should be 
changed .. .it is true that in war they [special forces 
type units] do produce a result out of all 
proportion to their aims, if properly employed; 
but they do not win battles; they are a luxury 
and it is very much doubted ifthey, in their true 
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sense, can be recruited from our peace time 
armed forces." 38 A month later the CGS 
announced his intention to disband the Canadian 
SAS Company upon the completion of airborne 
conversion training by the R22eR, who 
represented the last unit of the three Active Force 
infantry regiments to undertake it.39 As a result 
of this direction the posting of personnel to the 
SAS Company dried up. "It should be noted that 
in view of the present policy," complained the 
Army, "the AG [Adjutant General] Branch regards 
the SAS Coy as a wasting commitment and is 
loath to post personnel to fill existing vacancies 
in it. "40 
In a complete reversal, the VCGS affirmed in 
June 1949 that the SAS Company "will remain 
in being indefinitely with its present organization 
and establishment" and that it would be brought 
to strength. 41 The Army's lobbying in support of 
the sub-unit seemingly paid off. Despite the 
reprieve, however, the change in training focus 
and composition of the SAS Company, as a result 
of its instructional duties in support of CJATC's 
airborne conversion training for the Active Force 
infantry regiments, eroded the sub-unit's make-
up. The result was the demise of the organization. 
Problems with morale surfaced, particularly 
in the R22eR Platoon. An army investigation 
noted that the "deterioration only set in when the 
terms of reference for the SAS Company were 
radically altered." An analysis of SAS Company 
training revealed that the personnel were 
employed almost exclusively in administrative 
tasks, either in instruction or on parachute 
packing and maintenance. The R22eR Platoon 
was described as "carrying out a rather 
haphazard form of training, part time and is 
almost continually on call to load and lash 
equipment. "42 And finally, the majority of the 
Composite Platoon, which replaced the Patricia 
Platoon, was employed in parachute packing and 
maintenance. 43 
The discontent manifested itself in the 
refusal offive members to jump in a two month 
period and the request by individuals, 
particularly R22eR members, to return to their 
parent units. 44 Rumours and stories of 
dissension quickly spread. The situation was 
deemed so serious that the CGS personally 
visited Rivers in July 1949. Resolution to the 
problem followed swiftly. "The CGS having visited 
28 
CJATC Rivers," wrote the Vice Chief of the 
General Staff, "has directed that the platoon of 
the R22eR will be withdrawn as soon as 
administrative arrangements can be 
completed. "45 Although direction was also given 
to the Commanding Officer of the R22eR to post 
two officers and 15 "Other Ranks," by 1 
September 1949, as instructors to Rivers to 
replace the withdrawn personnel, the die had 
been cast. 
The SAS Company, whose role was never 
clear, became subsumed by the larger 
requirement to convert the infantry regiments 
into airborne units. By the time the program was 
terminated, the Special Air Service Company had 
virtually ceased to exist. Its personnel rejoined 
their parent regiments as their respective training 
was completed. Sergeant B.C. Robinson, a 
veteran of both l Canadian Parachute Battalion 
and the SAS Company, recalled that the news of 
the sub-unit's termination was discovered when 
Captain D'Artois informed the Company that they 
had been disbanded because the Mobile Striking 
Force was starting up. 46 The disbandment was 
so low key that no official date has been 
discovered. 
In the end, it seems as if the demise of the 
Canadian SAS Company was shrouded in as 
much contradiction as its establishment. 
Nonetheless, the SAS Company served as a 
"bridge" linking the Canadian Parachute Battalion 
and the three infantry battalions which 
conceptually formed an airborne brigadeY It 
perpetuated the airborne spirit and kept the 
requisite parachute skills alive. However, its 
existence suffered from a lack of clarity and 
commitment. Its 'successor' would be similarly 
handicapped. 
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